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Abstract
This paper examines what is the best method for pork producers to market pork products
with environmental attributes. The objective is to examine evidence of whether it is
beneficial for pork producers to incorporate multiple environmental attributes into a
single product or sell multiple products with a single environmental attribute.
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Introduction
Since the early 1980’s, there has been a structural change in the hog industry where
individual pork producers have expanded their operations by shifting to larger and larger
production facilities in more confined spaces to capture economies of size. With this
expansion, there have been rising concerns regarding the effect of pork production on the
environment especially with manure management (McBride and Key). These issues can
be segmented into two broad areas: managing air quality issues which stem from the byproduct of odor from production and managing water quality by storing and utilizing
manure in a way that will not contaminate surface and ground water.
In 2003, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the
authority of the Clean Water Act released a new set of regulations for non-point source
pollution concerning concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFO). These regulations
affect pork producers if their operation meets the definition of being an animal feeding
operation (AFO) and produces at least 2,500 swine over fifty-five pounds or 10,000
swine under fifty-five pounds.2 Examining the concentration ratio of pork-to-farms in the
top three producing states shows that Iowa, North Carolina, and Minnesota may be
heavily affected by the EPA regulations on CAFO’s. This is especially true for North
Carolina producers that have an average of 18,000 hogs per farm.
This paper examines how consumer’s value environmental attributes embedded in
the pork products they consume. It focuses on examining what is the best method for
2

The definition of an AFO is a “lot or facility (other than an aquatic animal production facility) where
animals (other than aquatic animals) have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and fed or maintained
for a total of 45 days or more in any 12-month period AND where crops, vegetation, forage growth, or
post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal growing season over any portion of the lot or facility.”
(Managing Manure, Section 1, pg. 3)
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pork producers to market pork products with environmental attributes from the marketing
standpoint. The primary objective of this paper is to provide evidence whether it is
beneficial for pork producers to incorporate multiple environmental attributes into a
single product or sell multiple products with a single environmental attribute.
This paper is split into the following sections. Section two gives a brief state of
affairs for the pork industry. In section three, conditions are discussed for a market
solution to environmental production externalities. Section four of the paper examines
Lancaster model of utility maximization based on characteristics and compares it to the
standard utility maximization problem. Section five outlines the experiment that was
used to collect the data. This experiment was designed to allow for the direct calculation
of the value of the characteristics embedded in the products, specifically environmental
attributed embedded in pork products. Section six explains the methodology for
examining consumer’s willingness-to-pay for pork products with environmental
attributes, while the results and implications are presented in section seven. Finally,
section eight gives summary and conclusions of this research.
The Current State of the Pork Industry
According to the 2002 USDA Agricultural Census, the pork industry sold
approximately 185 million pigs and hogs with a combined sales value of $12.4 billion.
The states of Iowa, North Carolina, and Minnesota accounted for over half of this
production. At approximately $3.1 billion in sales, 11,275 Iowa farms produced 41.2
million pigs and hogs, making Iowa the top producer of pork in the country with respect
to sales. North Carolina ranked second behind Iowa with $2.2 billion in sales and 42
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million hogs produced. North Carolina managed to produce this quantity of hogs on
2,300 farms. Minnesota is the third largest producer in the country with the production of
18.6 million pigs and hogs and $1.4 billion in sales, which were produced on 6,390
farms. When examining the average amount of pigs and hogs produced in each of these
states, North Carolina had the highest concentration with an average of over 18,000 hogs
per farm. Iowa’s average number of hogs and pigs per farm was over 3,600, while
Minnesota produced approximately 2900 hogs per farm.3
Due to the competitive nature of the pork industry, there tends to be no market
incentive for producers to produce pork with any consideration of environmental
attributes because producers must produce at the lowest cost to stay economically
competitive. An argument can be made that by producing pork that mitigates the
environmental effects from production that the production cost will decline and make the
producer more competitive. If this is true, then a competitive market would ensure that
the cost saving management practices and technologies have already been adopted. Since
the EPA is adopting further rules on large CAFO’s, it can be inferred that the socially
optimal amount of environmental protection from CAFO’s has not yet been achieved.
This leaves two broad avenues for handling production externalities related to manure
management in the industry to obtain the socially desired level—a regulatory solution or
a market solution.
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If all the states in the US are examined for their pork to farm concentration ratio, North Carolina, Iowa,
and Minnesota are in the top five with the ranking of first, third, and fifth respectively. Utah has the second
highest concentration at approximately 3,900 hogs and pigs per farm, while Oklahoma ranks fourth at
3,220.
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The first way to handle environmental externalities from pork production is by the
government directly regulating producers with or without the blessing of the producers.4
This is the current method that the EPA is using to induce large pork producers to
mitigate their effect on the environment from their production. According to Stavins,
using these types of command-and-control policies can have different cost effects on
producers and tend to be inefficient ways at handling externalities (2000).
The second way of handling production externalities is for pork producers to
produce hogs with environmental attributes and market those attributes to consumers.5 In
the document, Managing Manure, EPA outlines information on production technologies
and management practices that could lead to greater production efficiency of CAFO’s
that would further protect water quality affected by these facilities. For this to be a viable
solution there must be demand for pork products with environmental attributes.
Conditions for a Market Solution to Production Externalities
A necessary condition for the viability of a market solution, i.e., niche marketing pork
products with environmental attributes, is for producers to be able to cover all the
associated additional costs required to produce pork with environmental attributes. If this
is possible, the producer needs to identify the best way to market the environmental
attributes embedded in the product. This implies that the producer needs to understand
4

An industry may request the government to enforce regulations that the industry has developed for many
reasons. One major reason is to mitigate any future regulations that government may impose with little or
no input from the industry.
5
Throughout this paper, pork with embedded environmental attributes is discussed. Pork with embedded
environmental attributes is defined as pork that has been produced in a production system that has less of
an impact to the environment in comparison to what would be termed the typical system. This does not
imply that pork production in general is harmful to the environment; rather, it means that the pork
discussed in this paper was produced in a way that attempts to mitigate effects on the environment due to
production.
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how the consumer values pork with embedded environmental attributes. Does the
consumer prefer a product that has a bundle of environmental attributes, or is it better to
produce pork with a single environmental attribute? The producer is primarily interested
in whether the cost of adopting a certain production technology to attain greater
environmental sustainability will be compensated by increased revenue from producing a
product with environmental attributes.
It is not a priori obvious whether consumers would prefer to purchase one good
with multiple attributes, or multiple goods with single level attributes. Neither is it
obvious that consumers would want pork products with embedded environmental
attributes. Since pork production is primarily produced far away from the typical
consumer of pork products, the consumer does not usually get any direct benefits from
purchasing pork that has environmental characteristics. Even though consumers may not
receive a direct benefit from consuming pork with environmental attributes, they may
receive what Andreoni termed a warm-glow effect from giving (1990).
If consumers value products with environmental characteristics, then what mix of
environmental attributes would they prefer? By bundling multiple environmental
attributes into a single product, the consumer is forced to potentially purchase a product
that has some characteristics that are not desirable or not bundled in the correct
proportions. On the other hand, if you sell goods that have only a single level attribute,
the consumer would be forced to purchase multiple products if they wanted to consume
the multiple environmental attributes.
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Modeling the Valuation of Characteristics
The standard consumer maximization problem posits that consumers attempt to maximize
their utility given a budget constraint. Within this theory the consumer derives utility
from the consumption of goods which have a bundle of characteristics. Utility is derived
from the direct consumption of goods where the focus is on the good itself rather than the
characteristics.
Lancaster (1966) points out that one of the biggest drawbacks to examining
consumer behavior in the standard way is that it becomes difficult theoretically to
evaluate new commodities that consumers have no experience with. The key underlying
difference between standard utility theory and Lancaster’s view of utility theory is that
Lancaster believes utility is derived from characteristics embedded in a product rather
than the product itself which is a bundle of characteristics. Lancaster views the product
as a vessel that delivers attributes.
Lancaster bases his model on three primary assumptions. The first assumption is
that the good is a mechanism to carry attributes, where attributes provide the direct utility
to the person. He next assumes that most goods possess multiple attributes, and each
attribute is shared in multiple goods. His third assumption is that goods consumed
together can provide different attributes than goods consumed separately. This allows for
goods when consumed together to provide more utility than if they were consumed
separately.
A typical consumer in Lancaster’s model can be represented by the following
choice problem:
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Max U (C)
x

subject to : px ≤ M
C = f(x)
The nx1 vector C represents the characteristics that the consumer derives utility from,
where the utility function U(•) represents a continuous twice differentiable function
mapping characteristics to utility which is assumed to have the standard convexity
properties. Income is represented by M, while the 1xq price vector p represents the
prices of the qx1 vector of commodities x the consumer can purchase. The f(•) function
maps the attributes of the bundles consumed into characteristic space. Both the vectors x
and C are assumed to be positive.
The biggest advantage to using Lancaster’s model is that it focuses on attributes
of the products rather than the product itself. This motivates a hedonic approach to
analyzing the price of the goods based on valuing each of the attributes in the product.
Data Collection and Methods
There have been many studies that have used experimental auctions to value product
attributes. Hoffman et al. (1993) and Menkhaus et al. (1992) investigated willingness-to
pay for beef that is sold in different packaging under different information sets. Hayes et
al. (1996) did various experiments to obtain consumer’s willingness-to-pay for food
safety attributes. Melton et al. (1996a, 1996b) studied consumer’s willingness-to-pay for
pork chops with different visual characteristics. Roosen et al. (1998) examined what
consumers would pay for apples with reduced pesticides. Rousu et al. (2004) examined
what consumers would be willing-to-pay for differing tolerance levels of genetically
modified attributes embedded in canola oil, tortilla chips, and russet potatoes.
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Unlike previous studies of this nature, this research focuses on examining the
value of environmental attributes when they are bundled together. To facilitate this
research, data were collected by using a second-priced sealed-bid auction segmented into
five bidding rounds.6 In the first three rounds of this auction, participants bid only on the
physical attributes of the product, such as color and marbling, where the participants had
no other information except for the previous round’s bids. For the fourth round, the
participants were informed of the specific environmental attributes associated with the
respective products. Changes in bids would reflect the value of the respective
environmental attribute. In the fifth round, the implications of the environmental
attributes were further explained and the participants bid one final time.
Ten products with varying levels of environmental attributes were auctioned. Six
products had a single environmental attribute, two products had two environmental
attributes, one product had three environmental attributes, and one product had no
identified environmental attributes. Single attribute products were examined with
environmental attributes at a high level and a low level, while multiple attribute products
were evaluated only at high level attributes. The attributes examined were related to air
quality and water quality, where water quality attributes were segmented into surface
water and ground water attributes.
The products used to elicit bids were two-pound packages of uniformly cut,
boneless, 1¼ inch pork loin chops. The packages were arranged in a row and placed on
6

Hoffman et al. (1993), Menkhaus et al. (1992), Coppinger et al. (1980), Cox et al. (1985), Shogren et al.
(1994a), and List and Shogren (1999) explain the benefits and drawbacks of using a multiple-round
Vickrey auction versus a single-round Vickrey auction.
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ice in one of three white coolers. Each package was labeled as Package i, where i = 1,..,
10. Before the experiment began, the participants were invited up to the front of the
room to visually inspect the packages of pork chops. After the participants viewed the
packages, they were allowed to simultaneously bid on them for three rounds. After each
round, the highest bid and the number of the highest bidder was posted. Following the
third round each participant was told that one package was a “typical package” with no
specific environmental attributes, while the other nine packages were assigned varying
levels of environmental attributes listed in Table 1.
Three hundred twenty-nine observations were gathered from six different
locations across the United States: Ames, Iowa; Iowa Falls, Iowa; Manhattan, Kansas;
Raleigh, North Carolina; Burlington, Vermont; and Corvallis, Oregon. A random sample
of individuals drawn from local telephone numbers from the area being studied was used
to obtain participants for the study. Each experiment lasted approximately two hours at
each site. The first experiment was conducted at 9:00 a.m., the second at 11:30 a.m., and
the third at 2:00 p.m. To discourage collusive behavior being formed within the auction,
the participants were instructed that a three dollar penalty would be assessed if they were
discovered talking to other participants. Each participant was given a randomly
generated number to use as his/her identity during the experiment to maintain his/her
anonymity. Following Fox (1994), each participant was paid forty dollars for
participating in the experiment. As done in Fox et al. (1995, 1996) and Roosen et al.
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(1998), an attempt was made to control for wealth effects.7 The method used in each
experiment to control for wealth effects was a random drawing of one bidding round and
one product from that selected round to be the product sold at the end of the experiment.
Econometric Model and Testing Procedure
In the spirit of Lancaster’s approach to the consumer maximization problem where he
focuses on product characteristics, the following regression is estimated using ordinary
least squares:
(1)

Bidsr4 = α0 + α1*Bidsr3 + α2*LowAir + α3*HiAir + α4*LowGrndWat +
α5*HiGrndWat + α6*LowSurWat + α7*HiSurWat + α8* HiAirGrndWat +
α9* HiAirSurWat + α10* HiAirGrndSurWat + e,

where Bidsr3 and Bidsr4 are vectors of bids for the ten products in the auction from
round three and four respectively. LowAir, HiAir, LowGrndWat, HiGrndWat,
LowSurWat, and HiSurWat represent vectors of dummy variables where a one denotes
that the product being bid upon was a single-level attribute package that had the low or
high air quality attribute, the low or high ground water quality attribute, and the low or
high surface water quality attribute respectively. HiAirGrndWat and HiAirSurWat
represent vectors of dummy variables for the products that contained double
environmental attributes. The coefficient, HiAirGrndSurWat, represents a dummy
variable vector for the product with all three high-level environmental attributes
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Wealth effects are when participants change their bids because they won an earlier trial (Fox et al., 1995).
See Davis and Holt for a further discussion of wealth effects in experimental markets (1993).
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incorporated in the product. The vector of errors is represented by e and is assumed to
have the standard properties that make ordinary least squares appropriate for analysis.
The estimated coefficient α1 can be interpreted as the change in value of the
physical attributes once the environmental information has been released. This value
represents how much an ex ante dollar worth of physical attributes is valued once there
are products with environmental attributes on the market. If the environmental
information has no effect on the value of the physical attributes, then α1 should be equal
to one. A coefficient of less than one for this value implies that the physical attributes in
the product are being negatively affected by the environmental information, while a value
of greater than one implies that the environmental attributes have a positive effect on the
physical attributes. The coefficients for α2 through α10 can be interpreted as the
willingness-to-pay for the respective attribute(s) embedded in the product. It is expected
that the coefficients for the low-level products should be less than the high value
products. Products with multiple attributes are expected to be higher than products that
have only a single environmental attribute. If the consumer values the environmental
attribute(s) embedded in the product, these coefficients should be positive.
Results and Implications
Before explaining the results from the regression, it is important to examine the 3290 bids
from round three to round four. In round three the average bid for the ten packages of
pork chops is $4.12 with a standard deviation of 2.21, while in round four when the
environmental information is released about the packages the average bid increases to
$4.16 with a standard deviation of 2.30. Examining the null hypothesis that the bids
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between these two rounds are equal, it is found using a paired-sample t-test that the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the ninety-five percent confidence level (t = 1.57).
Hence, the environmental information did not significantly affect the overall average bid.
This implies that the participants did not spend significantly more when they discovered
that most of the products had environmental attributes. This is a significant result
because it implies that the market as a whole may not gain by producing products with
environmental attributes, i.e., the pork producers will not capture more of the consumer
food dollar by producing products with environmental attributes.
Table 2 presents results of estimating Equation 1 with ordinary least squares. The
coefficient for Bidsr3 is estimated at eighty-seven cents which demonstrates that
releasing environmental information does have an effect on the physical attributes of the
pork products. For every dollar that was bid in round three when the only information
the participants possessed about the products was regarding the physical attributes,
eighty-seven cents of that value carried over to round four when the environmental
attributes became known. This result implies that releasing environmental information
about the product can have a detrimental effect to those products that only maintain
physical attributes without incorporating any environmental attributes. Testing the null
hypothesis that this value is equal to one using a standard t-test, it is found that this
hypothesis can be rejected at the ninety-nine percent confidence interval with a p-value
less than 0.01.
Examining the coefficients related to the dummy variables in Table 2 shows that
all values are significantly greater than zero at the ninety-nine percent level except for the
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constant and the coefficient for low-level air quality improvement. This implies that the
participants in the study valued environmental attributes embedded in the products.
Comparing the single attribute products to the multiple attribute products shows that the
multiple attribute products received higher premiums than the products with only a
single-level attribute. In general, the magnitude of the willingness-to-pay for the
attributes increased when a higher level of a single attribute was present.
The only exception to the premium not having the expected magnitude for
ranking purposes was for the single low and high-level attribute for ground water where
the low-level attribute was valued at forty-three cents and the high-level of the attribute
was valued less at forty-one cents. Upon a closer examination of the bid data for the lowlevel product, it was found that the average bid for the low-level product was less than
any other product in round three by at least thirteen cents. Hence, the magnitude of this
premium may represent two affects—an attribute effect and a parity effect. The attribute
effect would be the amount of money that the participant is willing-to-pay for the
environmental attribute. The parity effect is the part of the premium that is paid to bring
the physical attributes of the product up to parity with others.
Table 3 presents the results of examining whether the value of the environmental
attributes in multiple products is equal to the value of the premium given for a
combination of attributes combined in one product. It appears at first glance that in all
cases the multiple attributes from the purchase of a single product is greater than the
value of the attributes when the participant had to purchase the equivalent attributes from
multiple packages. For example, the premiums for the three single-level attribute
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products add up to $1.33, whereas the product with the three equivalent attributes
combined into one product had a premium of $1.46. Testing the restriction that the
coefficient for the multiple attribute product is equal to the addition of the coefficients
from the multiple package shows that at the ninety-five percent level of confidence that
none of the null hypotheses can be rejected. Hence, the premiums for the attributes
appear to be additively separable. This implies that from the consumer standpoint, there
is nothing significantly gained by packaging multiple attributes into one product.
While the premiums above appear to be additively separable, does this mean that
it does not matter whether a producer produces a product with single attributes or a
product with multiple environmental attributes? Before information about environmental
attributes was released to the participants, it was found that the average bid for the
packages was $4.12. This leaves open the question of which producers would benefit
from a market that had pork products with embedded environmental products. Using the
results from Table 2 and Equation 1, each product can be examined in an ex post fashion
to see what the expected price would be for each package containing embedded
environmental attributes. This information is presented in Table 4. If the expected price
is greater than the average bid from round three, i.e., $4.12, then the producer would be
better off producing a package with that combination and/or level of environmental
attributes.8 On the other hand, if the value is less than $4.12, the producer would be
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This statement is only valid from the standpoint that the producer would be compensated for the loss of
the environmental attributes. This is not considering whether the premium gained compensates for the cost
of producing a product with the particular embedded environmental attributes.
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better-off if there was a market with no pork products that have embedded environmental
attributes.
From Table 4, it can be seen that the expected price the participants would be
willing to pay for a product that has a single level attribute, in general, would not be more
than if there were no products with environmental attributes. This implies that the
producers of products with single-level attributes would be worse-off. The producers that
would gain ex post in being in a market that has environmental attributes would be those
that produced products with double or triple attributes embedded in the product. The
product with a high-level impact reduction in surface water appears to be on the margin
whether this product would be beneficial to the producer. These findings imply that if a
pork producer is in a market where pork products with environmental attributes exist,
then that producer should produce hogs that have multiple attributes.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines from the consumer’s standpoint whether it would be better for
producers to sell pork products with embedded environmental attributes separately or in
combination. To accomplish this task, a consumer experiment utilizing a multi-product
second-price auction with five bidding rounds was presented that would allow for
collecting data to examine this issue. In the first three rounds of the auction, the
participants bid on physical characteristics of the pork products. In round four of the
bidding, consumers were made aware of the environmental attributes embedded in each
of the ten products being auctioned. From this information, ordinary least squares was
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used to estimate the value of each environmental attribute embedded in a single product,
as well as, the value of multiple environmental attributes combined into one product.
There are three major findings of this paper. First, it was discovered that pork
producers, in general, do not gain if a subset of producers produce products with
environmental attributes. The average bid from round three when the environmental
attributes were unknown to the participants was only four cents less than the average bid
in round four when participants were made aware of the environmental attributes
embedded in the products. This did not represent a significance difference in the bids.
The second major finding was that when information about environmental attributes
embedded in pork products are released, then the producer should expect that the
consumer will value the physical attributes of the product less. For each dollar that was
spent on the physical attributes in round three, only eighty-seven cents was estimated to
be spent in round four for those same attributes. Finally, it appears that the premiums for
single-level attributes can be additively combined to make-up the premium for the
multiple attribute product. This implies that the consumer is not significantly gaining
from a product that has multiple attributes combined.
Overall, it appears from this study that the pork industry will not gain as a whole
if pork is sold with environmental attributes. If the industry moves towards selling
products that explicitly purport to have environmental attributes, then it would be best for
producers to sell a product with multiple attributes in order to be better off than they were
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before environmental products were released.9 This is because the physical attributes of
the pork products get devalued by approximately thirteen percent.
There are many avenues that can be followed for continuing research regarding
embedding environmental attributes in products. Since this study used pork products as
the basis of comparison for pork products with environmental attributes, it would be
useful to know what would happen if a different product was used as a comparison, such
as chicken or beef. It is conjectured that if a different product is used as the basis for
environmental improvement, then the consumer would significantly shift part of her
consumer dollar away from the industry of comparison to the industry purporting
products with environmental attributes. A further extension to this is to examine what the
premium structure would look like if you sold competing products from two different
industries which both had products with and without embedded environmental attributes.
Another avenue of research would be to examine what would happen to bids if the
participants were required to purchase a combination of single-level attribute products
that would make them as well off as having products with multiple attributes. It is
unknown whether the consumer would discount the value of the environmental attributes
if she had to purchase multiple products. The experiments in this paper had the
properties of a single unit auction. Hence, the consumer was not affected by having to
purchase multiple units to obtain an equivalent amount of attributes contained in one
product.

9

This assumes that the additional cost of producing pork with the respective environmental attributes is
less than the premium the consumer is willing to pay for those attributes.
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Table 1: Environmental Attributes for the Packages of Pork Loin Chops
Pork Chop Environmental Attributes
(Level of Improvement over the Typical)

Package Labeling
for Experiment

No Specific Attributes (Typical Product)

Package 1

Odor 30-40%

Package 2

Odor 80-90%

Package 3

Ground water 15-25%

Package 4

Ground water 40-50%

Package 5

Surface Water 15-25%

Package 6

Surface Water 40-50%

Package 7

Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50%

Package 8

Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-50%

Package 9

Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50%/Surface Water 4050%

Package 10

Table 2: Explanatory Variables and Estimated Coefficients
Variable
Coefficient
Standard Error
Intercept
0.04
0.08

T-Value
0.46

BidRnd3

0.87

0.01

90.96*

LowAir

0.14

0.09

1.52

HiAir

0.37

0.09

4.00*

LowGrndWat

0.43

0.09

4.58*

HiGrndWat

0.41

0.09

4.44*

LowSurWat

0.36

0.09

3.79*

HiSurWat

0.55

0.09

5.81*

HiAirGrndWat

0.85

0.09

9.00*

HiAirSurWat

0.94

0.09

9.94*

HiAirGrndSurWat

1.46

0.09

15.55*

N = 3290
R2=0.72
*Indicates significance at the 99% level.

F-Value = 870.02
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Table 3: Hypothesis Tests for Additively Separable Premiums
Null Hypothesis*
Summation Premium for F-Value
of Single
Multiple
Package
Attribute
Premiums
Product

Prob > F

HiAir + HiGrndWat + HiSurWat =
HiAirGrndSurWat

$1.33

$1.46

0.42

0.52

HiGrndWat + HiAirSurWat =
HiAirGrndSurWat

$1.35

$1.46

0.69

0.41

HiSurWat + HiAirGrndWat =
HiAirGrndSurWat

$1.40

$1.46

0.27

0.60

HiAir + HiSurWat = HiAirSurWat

$0.92

$0.94

0.01

0.93

HiAir + HiGrndWat = HiAirGrndWat $0.78
$0.85
0.16
*The null hypothesis is rejected if Prob > F is less than or equal to 0.05

0.69

Table 4: Bids Evaluated at the Average Bid of $4.16 for the Estimated Equation 1
with the Particular Environmental Attribute
Package Containing Given
Expected Value of Package in an
Environmental Attribute
Environment with Environmental
Attributes
Odor 30-40%
$3.74
Odor 80-90%

$3.97

Ground water 15-25%

$4.03

Ground water 40-50%

$4.01

Surface Water 15-25%

$3.96

Surface Water 40-50%

$4.15

Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50%

$4.45

Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-50%

$4.54

Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 4050%/Surface Water 40-50%

$5.06
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